CHAPTER 2

Prelude to a Mission: War and Diplomacy, 1973–1979

In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared to provide extraordinary assistance in order to help Israel in relocation of Sinai military facilities to the Negev.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, 19 March 1979[1]

On 6 October 1973, the armed forces of Egypt and Syria launched surprise attacks against Israel. Carefully timed and coordinated, the blows took place on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish year. Initially, both offensives succeeded. In the north the Syrians sent the Israelis reeling from the Golan Heights. In the south the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal and penetrated deep into the Sinai peninsula. Within two weeks the Israelis, aided by massive infusions of American supplies and equipment, turned the tide on both fronts. The cease-fire agreements of 22 October in the north and 24 October in the south found the Israel Defense Force shaken but in control and the borders of 5 October virtually intact.[2]

The 1973 war broke the political and military deadlock in the Middle East. Arab forces fought far better than they had in any earlier conflict and showed a mastery of electronic warfare that portended heavy Israeli casualties in any future conflict. The war forced Israel to reassess Arab military capabilities and to calculate anew the costs of continuing the occupation of the Sinai peninsula.[3] By the same token, the Arab successes did a great deal to improve self-esteem among Israel's enemies, particularly Egypt, whose army had done extremely well in the first days of the war.[4] "There is no doubt," Israeli President and historian Chaim Herzog concluded, "that the initial Arab success in the Yom Kippur War satisfied their feelings of national honour."[5] In addition to altering the military balance, the war led to a vastly increased commitment by the United States to peace and stability in the Middle East. The new American involvement began with the wartime airlift of materiel to Israel. The American presence grew after the war, and the

ensuing oil embargo imposed by Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Nations (OPEC) showed the new military and economic power of the Arab nations. After 1973 "triangular diplomacy," with the United States as intermediary between Israel and the Arab nations—particularly Egypt—became a fact of regional negotiations.[6]

In the years that followed the war, the United States pursued several objectives in the Middle East. Foremost was avoidance of war, which had the potential to grow into a major regional conflict and lead to Soviet involvement or even a confrontation between the superpowers. Other U.S. goals included containment of Soviet influence, protection of access to oil, and assurance of Israel's survival. To these concerns, all of which existed in one form or another prior to 1973, was added an important new purpose: the improvement of relations and economic ties with Arab states, most notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt.[7]

Egypt's interests coincided with this American goal. President Anwar Sadat was dissatisfied with Soviet support during the October war. Moreover, Egypt viewed improved relations with the United States as a way to pressure Israel while achieving a more balanced relationship with the superpowers. In 1974 Sadat restored diplomatic relations with the United States, ending a seven-year break. Egypt also accepted American involvement in disengagement talks with Israel. Although frustrated in its efforts to obtain American arms, Egypt maintained good relations with the United States throughout the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.[8]

American diplomacy in the Middle East during those administrations was marked by the "shuttle diplomacy" of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Flying from one Arab capital to another as well as to Israel and home for consultations, Kissinger sought a way to convene a general peace conference while curbing Soviet influence. His efforts to create a basis for agreement between the Arab states, Israel, and the Palestinians as well as the superpowers never reached fruition.[9] Still, his diplomacy had two major long-lasting results. His overtures marked the beginning of a persistent American quest for an Arab-Israeli settlement. In time, even many Israelis came to appreciate this commitment by the United States, especially the economic and military help that came with it. In addition, Kissinger convinced two Arab nations—Egypt and Jordan—to sit at the table with Israel. Their unprecedented December 1973 meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, began the long process leading to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.[10]

So, when Democratic President Jimmy Carter took office in January 1977, certain breakthroughs had already been made. Some direct talks had taken place, and disengagement agreements had been reached on both fronts. The Carter administration, with a substantial interest in the Middle East rooted partly in the president's personal commitment, had a springboard for further efforts toward peace. Carter's approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, based largely on a Brookings Institution report of 1975, differed from that of Nixon and Ford. The new president abandoned step-by-step solutions through shuttle diplomacy. Instead, he sought a way to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement. The Carter administration felt that a bilateral accord between Egypt and Israel that ignored Palestinian aspirations would not be in the best interest of the United States. Such a deal would anger Saudi Arabia and could even provoke another Arab oil embargo. Moreover, the Americans still considered a regional peace to be attainable through a general conference in Geneva. Carter said publicly that such an agreement should include a Palestinian "entity" on the West Bank of the Jordan River, in the area Israel called Judea and Samaria, seriously dampening any Israeli enthusiasm for such a conference.[11]

In any case, the United States was under considerable pressure to reduce tensions and stabilize conditions in the Middle East. When the Shah's regime in Iran fell apart early in 1979 and gave way to a fundamentalist Muslim government, the United States lost a major ally. Moreover, the Soviet Union and Cuba were making inroads in Africa, notably in Ethiopia and the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. This situation demanded action that would end Egypt's confrontation with Israel and enable Egypt to deal with the threat of Soviet expansion from the south.[12]

From almost the outset, the Carter administration's interest in the Middle East was marked by a deep mutual affection and respect between Carter and Sadat. They first met in Washington in April 1977. According to Sadat, Carter was "a man who understands what I want, a man impelled by the power of religious faith and lofty values—a farmer like me."[13] Carter too wrote warmly of their understanding: "There was an easy and natural friendship between us from the first moment I knew Anwar Sadat. We trusted each other."[14]

This harmony did not keep Sadat from surprising Carter along with the rest of the world when he offered to go to Jerusalem. The Egyptian president's announcement astonished the People's Assembly in Cairo on 9 November 1977. Eleven days later he stood before Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the Israeli parliament, called the Knesset, telling Israel and the world he wanted

peace. Sadat's astounding gesture, which shifted the focus of negotiations from an overall settlement to bilateral talks between Egypt and Israel, drew mixed responses. Egyptians and Israelis alike welcomed his daring act. The Western democracies expressed pleasure and optimism regarding a settlement. Sadat's Arab allies, on the other hand, were appalled. Syria severed relations with Egypt, and leaders in many countries of the Middle East called for Sadat's assassination.[15]

Sadat said the trip, which Carter called "among the most dramatic events of modern history," emanated from the need for a new approach. Impatient with protocol and diplomacy, he sought a way around the formalities and procedural preoccupations that fettered diplomacy. When he first considered Jerusalem, he saw it as a location for a meeting of potential participants in a Geneva conference. A meeting there, he initially believed, could prepare for the more formal conference. Such a gathering could also make clear to Israel the prerequisites for any serious negotiations: withdrawal from occupied territories and acceptance of a Palestinian state. Then Sadat rejected this approach in favor of the visit that startled the world and redirected the focus of discussions from a broad framework to bilateral talks.[16] Begin's biographer called Sadat's grand gesture "a typical broad dramatic stroke."[17]

Several other factors underlay Sadat's decision. Troubles at home during 1977, notably the January riots after reduction of food price subsidies and the restiveness of fundamentalist Muslim groups, may have convinced him that the survival of his regime was at stake. A peace agreement that returned the Sinai to Egypt and brought new Western investment might save the situation. A Geneva conference promised to drag on for months without substantive results. Sadat's primary concerns included maintaining his presidency and preserving Egypt's sovereignty and national honor. The country had already spilled much blood and spent heavily on the Palestinian cause and was at best ambivalent toward continuing such outlays. In this framework the return of the Sinai took primacy. Sadat was willing to risk ostracism within the Arab community to attain it.[18]

Kissinger claimed that it was Arab nature "to believe that some epic event or personality will miraculously transcend the humdrum mess that is the usual human condition."[19] If such a tendency existed, Sadat's boldness and impatience surely reflected it. However, he thought carefully about the risks before taking action.[20] According to Kissinger, Sadat "understood that a heroic gesture can create a new reality."[21] He had acted in a grand and unpredictable manner in the past, expelling thousands of Soviet advisers

and technicians from Egypt in 1972 and reopening the Suez Canal three years later.[22] As ABC reporter Doreen Kays observed, Sadat "was an Arab leader with a history for surprises."[23] He also knew from experience the possibilities of such acts. In 1956, although a member of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council, he was surprised by President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Done in retaliation for the denial of financial aid for the great dam at Aswan by the United States and the International Bank, the seizure electrified Egypt and stunned the world. Sadat noted admiringly in his autobiography that this grand and stirring act made Nasser "an Egyptian mythical hero."[24]

But there was more behind the Jerusalem trip. Of all the Arab nations, Egypt had by far the most in common with Israel. The two countries shared a British colonial background—Sadat and Begin both had been involved in armed plots against British rule—and had made halting and unsuccessful efforts at accommodation.[25] So strong was this commonality that Israeli Lt. Gen. David Elazar reflected in 1972 that it was unfortunate that Israel and Egypt did not exist in isolation. "Left to our own devices," Elazar said, "we would have solved the points of contention between us easily and long ago."[26] Just two months before Sadat went to Jerusalem, both nations had secretly probed the extent of this shared interest. Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan had met with an Egyptian representative, Dr. Hassan Tuhami, in Rabat, Morocco, and explored the possibilities for a peace based on the return of the Sinai to Egypt. Other issues raised at their meeting included Palestinian rights and the status of territories occupied by Israel after the Six-Day War in 1967.[27]

Not only for its grandeur did Sadat's gesture please the Israelis. Israel lacked enthusiasm for multinational peace talks, preferring separate discussions with each of its neighbors. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, who resigned in protest when Sadat announced his willingness to visit Jerusalem, thought Begin saw Sadat's overture as a chance to move away from a general conference and into talks with Egypt alone. Later, Carter came to a similar conclusion. He thought Israel sought a separate peace with Egypt that assured retention of the West Bank and Gaza while avoiding talks with Jordan and the Palestinians. Sadat's gesture also satisfied Begin for reasons quite unrelated to Israeli foreign policy. After almost thirty years in opposition, Begin's Herut party controlled a governing coalition. He had been in office barely a year when Sadat arrived in Jerusalem. The visit greatly enhanced the Begin government's public acceptance and support.[28]

The only immediately apparent concrete result of Sadat's conciliatory journey was a series of military negotiations that began in Cairo in January 1978. The talks between the Israeli team led by Minister of Defense Ezer Weizmann and Egyptian General Muhammad Abd al-Ghani al-Gamassi clarified Israeli concerns regarding the Sinai. Israel had never given up an established settlement and insisted on keeping the towns in the northeastern corner of the Sinai. Israel also had a network of military bases on the peninsula. These provided a strong defense and allowed dispersal of combat aircraft over an area far larger than what historian Howard Sachar called "the narrow, and vulnerable, wedge of integral Israel."[29] Egypt was just as adamant: the settlements and bases had to go. For Sadat the issue was sovereignty, and he would accept no Israeli presence in the Sinai. The positions of both governments made a deadlock seem inevitable.

Negotiations foundered through the first half of 1978. Then Carter asked Begin and Sadat to meet him at Camp David. This invitation reflected the strong American commitment to a Middle East solution but was not born of any optimism on Carter's part. He thought success unlikely, but he knew no better way to restore momentum to the peace talks. Much to the surprise of nearly all observers, Begin and Sadat accepted the invitation for a meeting in early September.[30]

At the presidential retreat in Maryland's Catoctin Mountains, the issues split into those pertaining to a general regional peace and others relating to a treaty between Egypt and Israel. Strenuous and frustrating negotiations resolved only the latter questions. After a week of talks, the Israeli refusal to remove the Sinai settlements seemed to create a deadlock. Begin finally yielded. In the final analysis, he lacked the emotional tie to the Sinai that would make him resist even consideration of giving up the territories that he called Judea and Samaria. The Sinai was not part of *Eretz Yisrael*, the traditional land of Israel. So he agreed to leave the peninsula, convinced partly by Carter's warning that he would end the talks and publicly blame Begin for their failure. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown offered an incentive: help in building large Negev air bases as replacements for the Sinai fields. He also promised to have the new facilities completed before Israel finished its evacuation of the Sinai.[31]

The offer to help with base construction was a strong inducement to make an otherwise unpalatable concession. Israel considered the Sinai bases, which were built after the capture of the peninsula during the 1967 war, very important. The Israelis relied heavily on air power, and the Sinai gave Israel strategic depth. The

Egyptian Air Force, whose planes had once been at El Arish only seven minutes from Tel Aviv, was now more than twenty minutes away on the west bank of the Suez Canal. The Israeli Air Force, on the other hand, dispersed its facilities throughout the region, which was nearly three times as large as Israel proper. The Sinai gave Israel great freedom of action and vast tracts for training and maneuver. Already considered by many the best air force in the world, the Israeli Air Force prized the wide open spaces of the Sinai.[32]

Weizmann, who was a former air force pilot, repeatedly stressed the importance of the bases to Israeli security. General Mordechai Gur, chief of staff of the Israel Defense Force at the time of Camp David, agreed with Weizmann, who saw great risks in concentrating the air force's planes in fewer bases. Weizmann was willing to give up Sharm el Sheikh, which controlled waterborne access to the Israeli port of Eilat. He also was willing to give up large chunks of territory, but not the airfields.[33] "If we give them up," he commented half in jest, "we shall have to buy an aircraft carrier."[34]

The Israelis were especially concerned about the two largest bases. Eitam in the northern Sinai provided in-depth defense against an attack from Egypt. Etzion to the south protected navigation through the Straits of Tiran to Eilat and covered Israel's southern flank against attack from both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The base may have had other uses as well: one newspaper claimed that the Israeli planes that destroyed the Iraqi nuclear plant at Osirak in June 1981 came from Etzion.[35] Neither base was ever completed, but some experts considered Etzion to be "the finest tactical fighter base in the world."[36] Weizmann decided that Israel would have to give up the bases to get a peace agreement. At Camp David he asked Brown about American aid in building replacements, hoping to commit the United States to construction prior to withdrawal and thereby to shift the cost of relocation from the overburdened Israeli economy. Brown readily agreed to the possibility, prompting Weizmann to conclude that the American had anticipated the request. Thereafter, Begin saw the choice as either the airfields or peace. He opted for the latter.[37]

Before leaving the presidential retreat, Begin and Sadat signed two documents. The "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel" of 17 September 1978 followed the concept examined by Tuhami and Dayan in Rabat. It provided for return of the Sinai to Egypt and withdrawal of all Israeli forces and settlements. It limited Egyptian use of abandoned Israeli airfields to civilian purposes and guaranteed passage to Eilat and

Camp David accords. President Sadat, President Carter, and Prime Minister Begin signing the agreement.

through the Suez Canal for Israeli ships. This document became the basis for the treaty signed in Washington on 26 March 1979. The other agreement concerned a general regional peace. The "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" expressed the interests of both nations in "a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict." It also left the issues of Palestinian rights and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights open for negotiations.[38] With none of the key issues regarding the Palestinians and the territories decided, the overall agreement was extremely ambiguous. So the Camp David outcome amounted to a separate peace between Israel and Egypt, a result that did not get to the crux of the regional problem and that had not been sought by the United States or Egypt.[39]

The frameworks made no reference to American pledges of aid to either party. In fact, as Carter pointed out, few promises of any kind were made. Carter agreed only "to visit Egypt and to consult with Israel on how we might help with moving the Sinai airfields."[40] Even this cautious step showed Carter's awareness of the

importance of the bases. Brown knew that the Israelis relied heavily on their air force for defense. In a letter to Weizmann later in September, he spelled out the American understanding of the crucial importance of Israeli air power and the promise to discuss help with relocation. Brown understood "the special urgency and priority" Israel attached to preparing new bases "in light of its conviction that it cannot safely leave the Sinai air bases until the new ones are operational." He suggested talks on their scope and cost and on American aid that might facilitate construction. The president, Brown noted, stood ready to seek congressional authority for whatever aid the United States might offer.[41]

Camp David evoked a variety of responses. In the United States and Western Europe, public opinion generally supported the accords. Begin and Sadat shared the Nobel Peace Prize. Howard Sachar called the agreement "a good arrangement for both sides." Egypt obtained the territory it had lost in 1967; Israel won a reassuring transition period during which it could test Egyptian intentions prior to withdrawal as well as peace with its most formidable military foe. The Arab response differed dramatically from the Western reaction. The anger triggered by Sadat's trip to Jerusalem continued unabated. Egypt under Nasser had been leader of the Arab world; now the country was being vilified. At a hastily called conference in Baghdad, Iraq, leaders of most Arab states voiced their outrage, while the oil exporters of the Persian Gulf decided to cut off their once substantial financial aid to Egypt. Arab rejection shocked and wounded Sadat.[42]

The separation of Egypt from the Arab mainstream became an enduring feature of regional life. In 1983, four years after the treaty was concluded, Israel's neighbors remained adamant. Arab delegates at a conference of nonaligned nations in India won approval from representatives of 101 nations for a resolution condemning the Camp David agreement. Nowhere in the Arab world was the sense of betrayal and outrage greater than in Syria. The Syrians needed unremitting Egyptian pressure on Israel, which had occupied the Golan Heights after the 1967 war, ending 450 years of Damascus-based control. They feared that the end of Egyptian hostility might tempt Israel to solidify its hold on the Golan Heights. Events ultimately justified this concern: Israel annexed the heights in December 1981. Thereafter, Syrian opposition to any accommodation with the Israelis and to the Camp David accords only grew more intransigent.[43]

In Egypt the agreement won wide acclaim, albeit with significant exceptions. Some key officials resigned in protest, among them Fahmy's successor in the foreign ministry, Ibrahim Kamil. The ac-

cord with Israel also contributed to the alienation of fundamentalist Muslims, some of whom assassinated Sadat in October 1981.[44]

The agreement even received mixed reviews in Israel, which seemed to some the most obvious beneficiary. After all, the accords brought the promise of peace with its most powerful neighbor. However, Israel's argumentative and contentious political culture made unanimity unlikely in any case. Opponents included the religious right—just as it did in Egypt—and even members of Prime Minister Begin's governing coalition. Public relations adviser Shmuel Katz opposed even the implicit recognition of Palestinian political rights in the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and the unprecedented abandonment of the settlements on the Sinai coast. Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, and Chairman Moshe Arens of the Knesset Committee on Security and Foreign Relations all opposed the agreement, particularly if it meant giving up settlements.[45] Only in the democratic West did the accords win nearly universal approval.

The agreement set the stage for new developments in relations between the United States and Israel. After the signing, high-level American officials for the first time referred to Israel as an ally. This new closeness, which ultimately led to the 1981 memorandum on strategic cooperation, was underscored in 1979 by the Sixth Fleet's call at the port of Haifa. Also in the same year came a new kind of American aid, the construction of two new air bases for the Israeli Air Force.[46]

Notes

1. Ltr, Brown to Minister of Defense Ezer Weizmann, 19 Mar 79, METG files, OASD (ISA).

2. For a concise narrative of the October war, see Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, pp. 227–323. Some excellent and more detailed accounts of the war include the following: Avraham Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980); Hanoch Bartov, *Dado: 48 Years and 20 Days*, trans. Ina Friedman (Tel Aviv: *Ma'ariv* Book Guild, 1981); Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement, October 1973* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., 1975); Edgar O'Ballance, *No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978); Saad el Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez* (San Francisco, Calif.: American Mideast Research, 1980).

3. Howard M. Sachar, *A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), p. 826; Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, p. 321; Ismail Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), p. 34; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1982), pp. 460–61, 476.

4. Anwar el Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 249, 270. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the initial triumphs to Egyptian national pride and self-esteem. For some idea of the influence of these victories, see *The Book of the International Symposium on the 1973 October War, Cairo 28–31 October 1975* [Cairo: Ministry of War, 1976], pp. 5, 10, 31, 41, 43, and passim.

5. Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, p. 323.

6. Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, p. 34; Sachar, *A History of Israel*, p. 818; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 612–13.

7. Patrick Seale, "The Egypt-Israel Treaty and Its Implications," *World Today* 35 (May 1979): 189; Paul Jabber, "U.S. Interests and Regional Security in the Middle East," *Daedalus* 109 (Fall 1980): 69; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 615–16, 644.

8. Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, pp. 152, 155–57; Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, p. 321; Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, pp. 291–94; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 649, 747–48.

9. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 645–46; Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, pp. 294–96; Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, pp. 3, 214.

10. David Pollock, *The Politics of Pressure: American Arms and Israeli Policy Since the Six-Day War*, Contributions in Political Science, no. 79 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 166–67; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 797–98.

11. *Toward Peace in the Middle East: Report of a Study Group* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), passim; Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 292–95; Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, pp. 189–90, 199; Howard M. Sachar, *Egypt and Israel* (New York: Richard Marek Publishers, 1981), p. 262; Melvin A. Friedlander, *Sadat and Begin: The Domestic Politics of Peacemaking* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 51, 111; Robert O. Freedman, "Moscow, Jerusalem, and Washington in the Begin Era," in Robert O. Freedman, ed., *Israel in the Begin Era* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 161.

12. Seale, "The Egypt-Israel Treaty," pp. 190–91.

13. Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, p. 302.

14. Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 284.

15. Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, pp. 243, 297; Sachar, *Egypt and Israel*, pp. 266–67; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 309.

16. Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 297; Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, pp. 303–04, 306–07.

17. Eric Silver, *Begin: The Haunted Prophet* (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 174.

18. Friedlander, *Sadat and Begin*, pp. 31, 43–44, 70, 306; Doreen Kays, *Frogs and Scorpions: Egypt, Sadat and the Media* (London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1984), p. 83.

19. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 617.

20. Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 282; Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, p. 280; Mohamed Heikal, *Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat* (New York: Random House, 1983), p. 64.

21. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 647.

22. Sachar, *Israel and Egypt*, p. 263.

23. Kays, *Frogs and Scorpions*, p. 10.

24. Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, pp. 142–43.

25. Sachar, *Egypt and Israel*, pp. 3, 35–36, 40–41, 78–79; Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, *Sadat and His Statecraft* (London: The Kensal Press, 1982), p. 150; Donald Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days That Changed the Middle East* (New York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 338–39.

26. Bartov, *Dado*, p. 155.

27. Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), pp. 42–54.

28. Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, p. 251; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 409; Efram Torgovnik, "Likud 1977–1981: The Consolidation of Power," in Freedman, *Israel in the Begin Era*, pp. 20–21.

29. Sachar, *Egypt and Israel*, pp. 272–73.

30. Ibid., pp. 276–77; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 316; Seale, "The Egypt-Israel Treaty," pp. 189–90.

31. Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 394–96; Sachar, *Egypt and Israel*, p. 281. For insightful comments on the Israeli negotiating style, see Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 539; Silver, *Begin*, p. 161.

32. Sachar, *A History of Israel*, p. 639; T. R. Milton, "Mideast Survey: Problems and Prospects," *Air Force Magazine* 63 (August 1980): 71; Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, *The Six-Day War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 89, 194; Edward N. Luttwak and Daniel Horowitz, *The Israeli Army 1948–1973* (Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1983), p. 221; Interv (telephone), author with Col Haywood S. Hansell III, Jun 79, Washington, D.C.

33. Ezer Weizmann, *The Battle for Peace* (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), pp. 90, 96, 101, 104, 107, 139, 144, 170, 175, 181,183, 322.

34. Ibid., p. 175.

35. *Washington Post*, 10 Jun 81.

36. *Time*, 30 Mar 81.

37. Weizmann, *Battle for Peace*, pp. 371–72.

38. Friedlander, *Sadat and Begin*, p. 311; Sachar, *Egypt and Israel*, p. 282. For copies of the frameworks, see Dayan, *Breakthrough*, pp. 321–26.

39. Pollock, *Politics of Pressure*, p. 226.

40. Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 402.

41. Ltr, Brown to Weizmann, 28 Sep 78, METG files, OASD (ISA); Hansell interview.

42. Sachar, *Egypt and Israel*, pp. 282, 291; Friedlander, *Sadat and Begin*, p. 231; Freedman, "Moscow, Jerusalem, and Washington," pp. 173–76; Fernandez-

Armesto, *Sadat and His Statecraft*, pp. 134–35, 158–59; Heikal, *Autumn of Fury*, p. 174.

43. The *Middle East*, no. 102 (April 1983): 14; Seale, "The Egypt-Israel Treaty," p. 194; Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, p. 111; *Washington Post*, 14 Dec 81 and 11 Dec 83; Stanley Reed, "Syria's Assad: His Power and His Plan," *New York Times Magazine*, 19 Feb 84, pp. 59, 64; *Newsview* 4 (8 November 1983): 16.

44. Sachar, *Egypt and Israel*, p. 290; Heikal, *Autumn of Fury*, pp. 169, 210; Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, p. 291.

45. Freedman, "Moscow, Jerusalem, and Washington," p. 175; Shmuel Katz, *The Hollow Peace* (Jerusalem: Dvir and the *Jerusalem Post*, 1981), pp. 270, 280, 284; Bernard Avishai, "The Victory of the New Israel," *New York Review of Books* 28 (13 August 1981): 49; *International Herald Tribune*, 3 Sep 80; *Newsweek*, 16 Nov 81; Roger Rosenblatt, "From the Battlefield of Beliefs," *New York Times Book Review* 88 (6 November 1983): 1.

46. Pollock, *Politics of Pressure*, pp. 284-85.